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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 13-2551
___________
WEN QIN SHI,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A070-868-574)
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Donald Vincent Ferlise
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 29, 2014
Before:  CHAGARES, GARTH and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed:  March 19, 2014)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Petitioner Wen Qin Shi is a native and citizen of China who entered the United 
States in 1997, and is removable under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) & (a)(7)(A)(i)(I), as 
an alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, and without a 
2valid entry document.  Shi has two children, both United States citizens. Along with her 
husband, Rong Hua Cai, Shi applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under 
the Convention Against Torture (CAT) on the basis of the family planning policy in 
China, her marriage in the United States, and her two American-born children.  The
Immigration Judge denied the applications after determining that both Shi and her 
husband were not credible, and that her fear of sterilization was not well-founded; the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed.  More than a decade later, in January 
2013, Shi filed a motion to reopen the proceedings.  The BIA denied the motion as 
untimely, and further declined to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).  Shi has timely petitioned for review. 
We review the BIA’s decision to deny a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.
Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2006).  Under this standard, the BIA’s 
decision may be reversed only if it is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”  Sevoian 
v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2002).  We are without jurisdiction to review the 
Board’s decision declining to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings.  
See Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 475 (3d Cir. 2003).  
A petitioner seeking to reopen a hearing after the 90-day deadline must show that 
the basis of the motion is on changed country conditions, and the evidence supporting the 
motion could not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.  See 8
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).  Shi alleged that, since the final order denying her 
application for relief, she has become a devout Catholic and would face religious 
3persecution should she return to China.1 As the Government notes, Shi’s decision to 
convert to Christianity reflects a change in her personal circumstances, which is
insufficient to excuse her from the 90-day time limit on the motion to reopen.  See Liu v. 
Att’y Gen., 555 F.3d 145, 151-52 (3d Cir. 2009).  Her “choice to engage in such 
[religious] activities after being ordered deported does not support application of the
changed country conditions exception.” Khan v. Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 488, 497 (3d Cir. 
2012). The relevant inquiry, then, is whether Shi has presented sufficient evidence which 
was previously unavailable or undiscoverable to demonstrate a material change in 
treatment of Catholics in China since her asylum hearing.  See Liu, 555 F.3d at 148.
To support her contention that country conditions had changed in China, Shi
provided evidence in the form of letters from family and neighbors indicating that 
individuals have been persecuted on account of their faith. The BIA discounted Shi’s 
individualized evidence in part because it had not been substantiated.  It noted that Shi 
failed to present any credible evidence in the form of “arrest records, police reports,
detention release certificates . . .” or otherwise to support the statements.  The Board also 
found that the documents were “created for the purpose of litigation and are from 
interested witnesses who are not subject to cross-examination.”  See Chen v. Gonzales,
434 F.3d 212, 218 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that only corroboration was a letter from a 
family member who did not witness incident and who was not subject to cross 
1 Shi had also alleged, inter alia, that she would face persecution under China’s coercive 
population control policies.  She has limited her petition for review to the religious 
persecution claim.
4examination). Discounting this evidence was clearly not an abuse of discretion.  The
letters fail to provide specific names or dates regarding the purported persecution, and 
instead include very broad unsupported allegations.  Shi failed to explain why sufficient 
corroborating materials were unavailable to support the letters.  See generally Zhu v. 
Att’y Gen., ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 815133, at *7 (3d Cir. Mar. 4, 2014) (discussing 
ways a petitioner can attempt to authenticate evidence, including through corroborating 
materials).  The letters also clearly indicate that they are written exclusively for the 
purpose of the immigration proceedings.  Contrary to Shi’s contention, the Board did not 
wholly fail to consider her evidence; rather, it determined, and we agree, that the 
evidence was of insufficient evidentiary value to warrant reopening the proceedings.2
The BIA further considered two U.S. Department of State reports proffered by 
Shi—the 2011 Report on International Religious Freedom and the 2011 Country Report
for China. These reports indicate that China currently allows the practice of Christianity, 
although there is continued harassment of church members.3 Although Shi provided 
2 We note that the Board erred to the extent that it relied, “in part,” on a previous adverse 
credibility determination to discount the evidence supporting the religious persecution 
claim.  The adverse credibility finding, made by the IJ, related to Shi’s family planning 
claim.  Because there is no nexus between the adverse credibility determination and Shi’s
religious persecution claim, the Board improperly relied on it. See Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 
F.3d 556, 562-63 (3d Cir. 2004) (requiring a nexus between previous credibility findings 
and the issue under consideration).  Nevertheless, because the Board provided an 
independently sufficient basis for discounting the claim, any resulting error was harmless. 
3 We take issue with our dissenting colleague’s assertion that our case law requires the 
BIA to rely on the most recent country conditions report in order to provide meaningful 
review. As the dissent correctly notes, we have stressed the value of the BIA’s 
5numerous articles which generally describe an increase in religious persecution in China, 
the BIA concluded that she failed to provide credible individualized evidence that she
would be subject to persecution and, therefore, her claim was too speculative.  See In re
S-Y-G, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 251-52 (BIA 2007); see also Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 
308, 316 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that an asylum applicant must make a showing of a 
particularized threat of persecution). This conclusion cannot be said to be “arbitrary, 
irrational, or contrary to law.”  Sevoian, 290 F.3d at 174.4
consideration of current country conditions reports, and, to that end, we have “urged the 
BIA” to adopt policies which will ensure that administrative records are up-to-date.  See
Sheriff v. Att’y Gen., 587 F.3d 584, 591 (3d Cir. 2009). We have also suggested that, 
where an individual has shown past persecution (unlike Shi), the BIA may not rely solely 
on outdated country reports to rebut the alien’s fear of future persecution.  See Leia v. 
Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 427, 437 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314,
329 (3d Cir. 2004)).  We have stopped short, however, of imposing a general requirement 
on the BIA to consider, on its own, the most up-to-date country reports.  Accord Meghani 
v. I.N.S., 236 F.3d 843, 848 (7th Cir. 2001) (“However, we find no cases in which we 
held that the BIA is required to sua sponte take administrative notice of the most recent 
country report, and [petitioner] cites no cases holding such.”) (emphasis in original).  The 
burden of proof is on the asylum seeker, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a), and the BIA has “‘a duty 
to explicitly consider any country conditions evidence submitted by an applicant that 
materially bears on [her] claim,’ and ‘[a] similar, if not greater, duty arises in the context 
of motions to reopen based on changed country conditions.’”  Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 
F.3d 260, 268 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); see also Zhu v. Att’y Gen., ___ F.3d ___, 
2014 WL 815133, at *7 (3d Cir. Mar. 4, 2014) (remanding for the BIA to meaningfully 
review a more recent country conditions report which had been proffered by the 
petitioner as evidence of changed country conditions).  There is no dispute that the Board 
fully considered the 2011 country conditions report proffered by Shi.  Finally, while we 
agree with the dissent that we may take judicial notice of changed political circumstances 
that have occurred after an order of removal has been issued, Shi has not pointed to any 
specific information in a more recent country report that would have changed the 
outcome of this case.  See Nbaye v. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 57, 60 (3d Cir. 2011).
4 Significantly, Shi failed to sufficiently explain how past conditions faced by Catholics 
had in fact materially changed since the asylum hearing. We note that the State
6We are persuaded that the BIA took adequate account of the evidence submitted in 
support of Shi’s motion to reopen and that no reasonable factfinder would be compelled 
to find that there has been a material worsening since 2001 of China’s religious 
repression policies.  Accordingly, because Shi failed to demonstrate changed country 
conditions, the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion to reopen.  
Department’s 2000 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for China indicates that 
“[u]napproved religious groups, including Protestant and Catholic groups . . . continued 
to experience varying degrees of official interference, repression, and persecution.” A.R.
at 489. The report was made part of the record at the time of the merits hearing and 
suggests continuing problems, rather than a change. 
1Wen Shi v. Attorney General U.S.A., No. 13-2551
GARTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Wen Shi, the Chinese petitioner in this matter, has been in the United States since 
1997 and has two children who are United States citizens.  Shi has alleged that she has 
become a devout Catholic and would face religious persecution as well as “coercive 
population control policies” if she were returned to China. As the majority observes 
correctly, the relevant inquiry in this case is whether Shi has shown “changed country 
conditions” that would lend credence to her claims that she would face persecution were 
she to be removed to her native country.1
In rejecting Shi’s claim, the BIA concluded that she had failed to show changed
country conditions because, inter alia: (1) the letters from family and neighbors that she 
submitted in support of her claim had not been substantiated and were not of the sort of 
evidence that we had deemed sufficient or credible in the past; and (2) the 2011 Religious 
Freedom Report and the State Department’s 2011 Country Report failed to provide 
credible individualized evidence that Shi would be subject to persecution.
Unlike the majority, I conclude that the BIA abused its discretion in relying on an 
outdated Country Report to reject Shi’s claims.  We have noted that “in the troubled areas 
of the planet from which asylum claims tend to come, the pace of change is rapid –
                                                          
1 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) (“There is no time limit on the filing of a motion to 
reopen if the basis of the motion is to apply for relief under sections1 1158 or 1231(b)(3) 
of this title and is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of 
nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material 
and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous 
proceeding.”).
2oppressive regimes rise and fall, and conditions improve and worsen for vulnerable . . . 
minorities.” Leia v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 427, 437 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation 
omitted).  Accordingly, we have “suggested that outdated country reports by themselves 
are insufficient to rebut an individual’s fear of persecution.”  Id.
We further explained the value of current Country Reports in Sheriff v. Attorney 
Gen. of U.S., 587 F.3d 584 (3d Cir. 2009).
In [Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2004) abrogated on other grounds 
by Nbaye v. Attorney General, 665 F.3d 57 (3d Cir. 2011)] we expressed our 
strong displeasure with the state of affairs presented by our appellate review of 
BIA decisions. Too frequently, we complained, the BIA was relying upon 
outdated and antiquated Country Reports not reflective of the state of affairs even 
at the time of the BIA’s decision. See id. at 328-31 (discussing the problems 
presented by stale administrative records in asylum cases, and noting that “[i]t has 
become common that . . . country reports in the administrative record are three or 
four years old by the time the petition for review comes before us”). Accordingly, 
we urged the BIA to make greater use of procedures allowing for the reopening of 
proceedings based on new facts, and also urged the BIA “to adopt – by opinion, 
regulation, or otherwise – policies that will avoid the Court of Appeals having to 
review administrative records so out-of-date as to verge on meaningless.” Id.
Sheriff, 587 F.3d 584, 591.
Indeed, in Zhu v. Attorney General, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 815133 (3d Cir. Mar. 
4, 2014), we recently addressed a similar situation and granted a Chinese immigrant’s 
motion to reopen where the BIA had failed to consider whether recent Country Reports 
established changed country conditions. While the petitioner in Zhu appears to have 
proffered a wider array of evidence than Shi, our decision and analysis there, requiring 
the BIA to consider more fully the present Chinese policies in order to grant the 
petitioner the requisite “meaningful review,” indicates that we view China as a “troubled 
3area[]” where “the pace of change is rapid” and where the mutability of national policies 
must be considered with due care. Leia, 393 F.3d at 437.
Here, however, the BIA relied on a 2011 Country Report in order to make a 
determination regarding the “facts on the ground” in China in 2013.  While I am mindful 
of the deferential standard of review afforded to the IJ and the BIA, see Sevoian v. 
Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that the BIA’s decision may only be 
reversed if it is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law”), I would hold that the use of an 
outdated Country Report to make a judgment about present conditions in Shi’s case is
both irrational and contrary to the principles that we articulated in Leia. To deny that 
country conditions have changed based on an outdated Country Report would be to deny 
that country conditions can change, a holding that would run counter to both logic and 
the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) (“There is no time limit on the filing 
of a motion to reopen if the basis of the motion is to apply for relief . . . is based on 
changed country conditions . . .”). See note 1, supra.
This result is further supported by our decision in Nbaye to remand for 
consideration of more recent development in country conditions:
It seems to us that it would be myopic to ignore the circumstance that the RPG has 
come to power in Guinea inasmuch as Nbaye attributes his persecution to 
membership in that party.  We have concluded that although we cannot decide the 
case on the basis that there has been a change in power in Guinea, our precedents 
and 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A) on the one hand and the seemingly appropriate way 
to proceed in this matter on the other can be accommodated by remanding the case 
to the BIA so that it can consider the change in power in Guinea.
665 F.3d at 60.  That is, even though Shi may not have provided the most recent Country 
Reports to the BIA, in light of our holding and analysis regarding Chinese Country 
4Reports in Zhu, it would be “myopic” to ignore the well-documented facts on the ground
and affirm a BIA decision reached without considering them.
Accordingly, I would remand this case for reopening on the issues presented in 
light of the most recent Country Report, and in light of Zhu, which reinforces our 
precedents. I respectfully dissent.
